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In John Healey's resignation letter, (he was the UK Defense Secretary), to the UK Prime Minister yesterday, the key paragraph is "Your DIP financial
statement - which I was first given in full on Monday afternoon this week -
falls well short of what is required for defence and the country at this
difficult time". A link to John Healey's X post with his letter is below. Below that is a summary of what the Strategic Defense Review (SDR) suggested needed to be delivered in a DIP (Defense Investment Programme). My analysis
suggests the SDR had some 44 actions with stated timescales, of which at least
24 should have already been achieved. (A table with my analysis of the 47
milestoned action is at the foot of this post.)
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The obvious three immediate questions which need answers are:
1) Of the 24 SDR deliverables with milestones which should have already been delivered, (before May 2026), how many have actually been fully delivered?
2) Given the DIP fianncial statement delivered to John Healy this past Monday, which of the SDRs suggested 44 deliverables with milestones are now delayed, descoped or deleted?
3) How many people saw the full DIP financial statement before the Defense Secretary saw it this Monday?
My letter to the Prime Minister pic.twitter.com/j9z9nmLCb1
— John Healey (@JohnHealey_MP) June 11, 2026
SUMMARY OF SDR
The Strategic Defence Review – Making Britain safer: secure at home, strong abroad was published in June 2025 with its 62 recommendations covering a vision for UK defence over the next 10 years. The recommendations are premised on government’s commitment to reach 3% of GDP on defence spending in the next Parliament, when fiscal and economic conditions allow. Obviously if more £ is available or defence capabilities can be delivered more efficiently the vision could be achieved faster than the ten-year timescale currently envisaged.
Phrases from the review that give you a summary of what it is about include:
The Review and it's context - a “root and branch review of defence” in a world “more serious and less predictable than at any time since the end of the Cold War” and where “technology is changing how war is fought”
The Vision and transformation - a “landmark shift” towards “warfighting readiness” with a “a model of constant innovation of the Integrated Force at wartime pace, delivered through a new partnership with industry” requiring technological innovation to create a new “hybrid navy” with aircraft carriers becoming the “first European hybrid air wing” (combining fast jets, long-range weapons and drones), a “British Army that is 10X more lethal” and a “next-generation RAF…to defend Britain’s skies and strike anywhere in the world”. A “NATO first” approach with no fixed ’end state’ for an integrated force which will “evolve as threats and technologies do”. A “whole of society approach” to implementation.
Immediate actions
- £15 billion investent to 2029 on the sovereign warhead UK nuclear deterrent programme,
- up to £1 billion in new funding for homeland air and missile defence including a new Cyber and Electromagnetic (CyberEM) Command to defend the UK.
- £6 billion investment to 2029 including £1.5 billion in an ‘always on’ pipeline for munitions and at least six new energetics and munitions factories in the UK.
- production of a submarine every 18 months ao the AUKUS SSN programme delivers a fleet of up to 12 nuclear-powered attack submarines
- building up to 7,000 new long-range weapons in the UK.
- more than £1 billion investment billion to integrate forces through a new Digital Targeting Web delivered in 2027.
- £400 million fund to grow and support UK-based companies UK Defence Innovation
- establishment of a new Defence Exports Office.
- at least £7 billion of funding to 2029 to deliver “a generational renewal of military accommodation”, including over £1.5 billion in new investment for rapid work to improve service family accommodation.
The government also outlined its intention to combine AI and autonomy with conventional warfighting capabilities, to create a new “hybrid navy”, including transforming the UK’s aircraft carriers to become the “first European hybrid air wing” combining fast jets, long-range weapons and drones; a “British Army that is 10X more lethal”; and a “next-generation RAF…to defend Britain’s skies and strike anywhere in the world”.
Commons Library briefing papers
The Commons Library has published a series of briefing papers which examine individual aspects of UK defence and the outcomes of the Strategic Defence Review, and which lay the groundwork for scrutinising decisions that may come out of the MOD’s Defence Investment Plan.
A Commons Library timeline of the strategies and consultations that the SDR promised will be published shortly.
- Strategic Defence Review 2025: NATO, June 2025. What does the SDR mean by a ‘NATO first’ approach?
- Strategic Defence Review 2025: Armed forces personnel, June 2025. The SDR said a “workforce crisis” had been created.
- Strategic Defence Review 2025: Armed forces housing, June 2025. What did the SDR say about service accommodation?
- Strategic Defence Review 2025: The UK’s nuclear deterrent, June 2025. What are the implications of the SDR for the UK’s nuclear deterrent?
- Strategic Defence Review 2025: The Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary, November 2025. What did the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review recommend for the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary?
- Strategic Defence Review 2025: The British Army, December 2025.What did the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defence Review recommend for the British Army?
- UK defence in 2025: Integrated air and missile defence, June 2025. What air defence capabilities does the UK have to protect the UK homeland and what did the SDR say?
- UK defence in 2025: Renewed interest in the Arctic, November 2025. How is UK defence responding to increasing geopolitical competition in the Arctic/ High North?
- UK defence in 2025: Tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery, May 2025. How the army is organised, modernisation plans and a summary of the army’s current and future fleets of armoured vehicles.
- UK defence in 2025: Warships and the surface fleet, November 2025. A summary of current ships in the Royal Navy and Royal Fleet Auxiliary and planned vessels.
- UK defence in 2025: Aircraft fleets, April 2025. What aircraft do the armed forces fly now? What aircraft will they operate in the future?
- AUKUS submarine (SSN-A) programme, August 2025. A major part of the AUKUS agreement between the UK, the US and Australia is the delivery of a conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine fleet for Australia.
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By When |
Recommendation No. (Actual SDR text is in “ “ marks and italic
font) |
This table action no. |
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2025 |
19 Re training
and education “A review of current standards, qualifications, and in-house
training should be completed by the end of 2025” 51 By the
end of 2025, the MOD should establish an initial operating capability for a
new CyberEM Command within Strategic Command. “ |
1
2 |
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October |
15 As concerns “plan to prioritise and address the structural, behavioural, and
leadership barriers” – “Recommendations
for independent oversight of implementation should be made by October 2025.” |
3 |
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November |
16 “Defence
must offer novel ways of entry into the Armed Forces that attract more people
from a wider range of backgrounds, submitting a plan with timelines for
delivery to the Secretary of State by November 2025” 54 “Defence should cohere and maximise its expert intelligence
capabilities under a single enterprise, ‘Military Intelligence Services’
(MIS), by November 2025” 56 “By
November 2025, the MOD must establish a single Defence Counter-Intelligence
Unit within DI with a mandate to protect Defence from hostile intelligence
services, working closely with UKIC.” |
4
5
6 |
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December |
7 “MOD
should establish a revitalised system for science and technology and
innovation that more directly responds to the annual problem set provided by
the MSHQ to the National Armaments Director (NAD).” 21 “The MOD should co-ordinate with other Government departments
and agencies to prioritise the use of the defence instrument in support of UK
defence and wider foreign policy. It should do so based on a new Defence
Diplomacy Strategy, to be completed by December 2025” |
7
8
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2026 |
5 “deliver a
digital targeting web …. requiring access, in whole or in part, to a
Defence-wide Secret Cloud, with a minimum viable product available in 2026.” 18 “By the
end of 2026, Defence must establish a career education pathway for the whole
force—Regulars, Reserves, and Civil Service—designed to respond to the
changing ways of warfare over time, and with NATO at its heart.” |
9
10 |
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January |
2 “Defence
must establish a roadmap for delivering this deeper interoperability with
NATO Allies and for leading the way on shared approaches and standards by
January 2026” 19 “Training
and education must be adaptive to operational lessons, innovation, and
research. The MOD must rewrite the relevant policy by January 2026,
empowering those who deliver training to revise courses at speed and
consulting them in the policy’s design.” |
11
12
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February |
26 “By
February 2026, the Defence Academy should establish a plan for inviting
company leaders, from FTSE100 companies and wider, onto Defence courses as
appropriate” 29 “Defence
should establish an initial operating capability for a new Defence Uncrewed
Systems Centre by February 2026” 58 “Establish
a ten-year physical infrastructure plan for Defence medical by February 2026” 59 “The MOD
must deliver an overarching infrastructure Recapitalisation Plan to the
Secretary of State by February 2026” |
13
14
15
16 |
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March |
6 “To boost
private investment in the defence and dual-use technology sectors, and to
support new entrants and innovation, the MOD should develop a dedicated
strategy for the financial services sector by March 2026” 8 “This new approach to market segmentation
and capability portfolios should be established by March 2026” so “On new
partnership with industry “Greater agility and productivity should be
delivered through service-agnostic capability portfolios and a segmented
approach to procurement: ·
Major modular platforms
(contracting within two years). ·
Pace-setting spiral and
modular upgrades (contracting within a year). ·
Rapid commercial
exploitation (contracting within three months). This segment should benefit
from protected funding, with at least 10% of the MOD’s equipment procurement
budget spent on novel technologies each year.[footnote 58] ” 20 “Defence must invest in foundational
leadership, financial, commercial, and technology skills across the civilian
and military workforce. This should include: the flexibility to reward the
development of expertise in specialist areas, including through pay and
promotion freedoms; and developing a two-way secondment programme with a
focus on short-term, informal schemes that are effective and can be delivered
quickly. A plan for delivery should be developed by March 2026.” 58 “Create a ‘whole force’ plan that
identifies workforce requirements, incentivisation, and measures to return
non-deployable personnel to fighting fitness as quickly as possible as part
of an enduring approach agreed with the NHS. Strategic Command should develop
this plan by March 2026”. |
17
18
19 20
21
22
23 |
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Quarterly |
4 “Progress in establishing the
fundamental capabilities of a core common platform …. reported to the
Secretary of State on a quarterly basis.” 7 Defence
Research and Evaluation organisation
and UK Defence Innovation organisation “NAD
should set ambitious targets for pull through and scaling, reporting
quarterly to the Secretary of State on these efforts.” |
24
25 |
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April |
10 “By April
2026, the MOD should develop a package of support for its industrial partners
that removes barriers to collaboration and drives better, more cost-effective
results: reducing by at least 50% the burden of Defence Standards and
Conditions; working across Government to amend the Single Source Contract
Regulations; reforming regulations, Intellectual Property handling, and
security clearance requirements; and providing access to intelligence, data,
and test and evaluation sites.” 25 “To support the development of the
Integrated Global Defence Network, the MOD should: Complete a review of its
principal elements by April 2026, optimising Defence’s overseas footprint for
delivering its core roles (Chapter 3)” 39 “More flexible regulation
is needed to enable experimentation in areas such as autonomy. By April 2026,
Defence should establish options to enhance the mandate of the Defence
Maritime Regulator to allow the Royal Navy and industry to use a dedicated
regulatory ‘sandbox’ to test and deploy new technologies” |
26
27
28 |
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May |
15 MOD “should rewrite its ‘people’ policies in accordance with the principle
of trust, starting with the top ten by May 2026.” |
29 |
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June |
16 “Develop a
plan to prioritise and address the structural, behavioural, and leadership
barriers to the creation of a more representative and meritocratic workforce
that resolutely delivers a more capable warfighting and deterrent force. This
plan should be established by June 2026” Also
see October 2025 on same recommendation 48 “A review of storage and
other standards is required to remove regulations that place unnecessary
constraints on training and impose significant unnecessary cost in the
lifecycle of highly expensive weapons. This review should be completed by
June 2026” |
30
31 |
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July |
2 “Implementation should commence
no later than July 2026.” Also see Recommendation 2 above against Jan
2026 |
32 |
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July |
5 “MOD should report to the
Secretary of State by July 2026 on assurance of critical data flows, with a
plan for scaling up dissemination and exploitation of data in warfare and
across Defence” and “A new Digital Warfighter group should be
established, with appropriate recruitment and pay freedoms, by July 2026.
This new group should allow Defence to deploy digital and conventional
warfighters on operations side-by-side.” |
33
34 |
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September |
7 “Highly expert Defence researchers should serve as affiliated faculty
to partner universities, starting in the 2026–27 academic year.” |
35 |
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December |
27 “the MOD should develop
options for the protection of CNI in the event of crisis or conflict,
including a new Reserve Force, with plans presented to the Secretary of State
by December 2026”. |
36 |
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Annually |
4 “statement
to the Secretary of State on force design that identifies what has changed” and “evaluation of the effectiveness of the Integrated Force
model” |
37 |
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Annually |
5 “minimum
annual shift of 10% expenditure from current to next-generation capabilities
on its enterprise digital platforms and services” |
38 |
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Periodically |
57 “An
independent review board, akin to the US Defense Health Board, should assure
ecosystem readiness, reporting periodically to Ministers, the Defence Board,
and Parliament” |
39 |
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2027 |
5 “deliver a digital
targeting web in 2027, requiring access, in whole or in part, to a
Defence-wide Secret Cloud” Also see recommendation
5 against 2026 above |
40 |
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January |
28 “A
digitised approach to Reserves management should be established by January
2027” |
41 |
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2028 |
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July |
14. “To
maximise existing resources, the MOD should seek to move all Regular
personnel from administrative into front-line roles and should automate at
least 20% of Human Resources, Finance, and Commercial functions by July 2028.
This should be delivered as a minimum first step” |
42 |
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2029 |
27 “Strengthening Government
powers to protect CNI where necessary, completing the process of updating
existing legislation or bringing forward new legislation by the end of this
Parliament (2029)” |
43 |
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2030 |
14 “Civil
Service costs should be reduced by at least 10% by 2030” 26 “Expand in-school and community-based Cadet Forces across the
country by 30% by 2030, with an ambition to reach 250,000 in the longer term” |
44 |
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